France embraces anglophone Africa as ties to former colonies fray

Speaking at the 2025 Africa Day at Sciences Po in Paris at the start of October, French foreign minister Jean-Noël Barrot sought to emphasise the country’s commitment to the continent at a time when its historical relationships in Africa are in flux.

“My conviction is simple, and it has not changed: France carries within it a part of Africa that makes it stronger,” Barrot said. “Let us look at the African continent which is brimming [with potential]: in the incubators of Abidjan, in the shipyards of Cape Town, the ports of Tangier and Dar-es-Salaam, there is an energy at work on the continent.”

“France innovates faster than the rest of the world and France is at Africa’s side, when it comes to diplomacy, business, and its public or private initiatives,” he added.

As Barrot also alluded to during his speech at Sciences Po, France is currently working to update its continental strategy ahead of next May’s France-Africa Summit in Nairobi.

The end of Françafrique?

While precise details are yet to emerge, the signs are that Paris, perhaps in response to increasingly high levels of anti-French sentiment in its former African colonies, will prioritise building new political and commercial ties with anglophone African nations.

France’s influence in its former African colonies – known by the term Françafrique – has seriously declined in recent years, with a range of military coups in the Sahel – such as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – leading to the expulsion of French troops and the cancellation of military agreements.

These coups have often been driven by explicitly anti-French sentiment and involved the open embrace of France’s adversaries, such as Russia.

Controversy has also centred on perceived remnants of French colonial control – such as through the use of the CFA franc which requires former colonies to deposit at least 50% of their foreign reserves with the French Treasury in Paris –

Events in the Sahel have not only diminished France’s diplomatic and political clout on the continent but contributed to declining commercial success in Africa as well. In banking, for example, Crédit Agricole, BNP Paribas, and Société Générale have all withdrawn from the African market in the last few years – with the higher geopolitical risks a key reason for this.

Jamal El Mellali, Fitch Ratings’ director covering African banks, previously told African Business that “African markets are higher risk and the level of returns of their subsidiaries, from the French banks’ perspective, are often not enough to justify their presence there.”

Nairobi calling

The symbolism of hosting next year’s summit in Nairobi – one of the continent’s most significant English-speaking political and business hubs – is clear. President Emmanuel Macron (pictured above with Kenya’s President William Ruto in September) is widely seen to have put this pivot in motion in November last year, when Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu visited France on a two-day state visit, the first such trip undertaken by a Nigerian leader in twenty years.

The occasion, which included a meeting at the Franco-Nigerian Business Council and focused on investment opportunities that would benefit both sides, demonstrated President Macron’s efforts to reorientate France’s African relationships.

Alain Antil, a researcher in Sub-Saharan Africa at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), pointed out at the time that France “is not held back by its colonial past” in anglophone countries, while economist Kako Nubukpo noted that pivot towards English-speaking Africa was “not a new trend” but that “the crises in the Sahel have accelerated this dynamic.”

Douglas Yates, a professor of political science at the American Graduate School in Paris and expert in France-Africa relations, suggests that the country is also seeking to broaden its relationships beyond francophone Africa for commercial reasons – not least because France’s two biggest trading partners on the continent come from the anglophone world, Nigeria and South Africa.

“The pivot is part of what I called “the paradox of predation.” Through its predatory neocolonial relationships, France underdeveloped its francophone African states,” Yates tells African Business. “So, it is no surprise that it has decided to venture out into the anglophone – and lusophone – African sphere to profit from business opportunities.”

The exact agenda of the Nairobi Summit has yet to be disclosed, but the Kenyan government has said it will “focus on climate change, environmental challenges, and financial system reform […] the Government of Kenya looks forward to hosting a transformative Summit that redefines Africa-France relations through innovation, sustainability, and shared prosperity.”

What practical outcomes can be expected from the Nairobi Summit and France’s broader shift towards anglophone Africa? Yates notes that “new French foreign direct investments in Kenya are one possibility – and there are always African states so thirsty for capital that they will do business with France.”

Investment potential

A joint communiqué issued between Kenya and France on the sidelines of the recent United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York suggested that investment in industries including green energy, artificial intelligence, and sustainable agriculture could be on the agenda.

“French private capital would like to penetrate the booming energy sectors, so look for Total [the French multinational energy and gas company] to announce something,” Yates says.

On a geopolitical level, Yates also suspects that the summit is designed to help bolster French influence in a region that is increasingly emerging as strategically vital. Kenya and East Africa’s proximity to Western military bases in Djibouti, as well as the ongoing tensions in nearby Somalia and Sudan, make it essential for Western powers such as France to have strong political and diplomatic networks in the region.

“I think the Nairobi Summit is really about laying the groundwork for more secretive strategic relations in the north of Kenya, where the war on Islamic terrorists continues, and in East Africa more generally to improve France’s retarded position in the Indian Ocean,” he says. “France also has permanently positioned troops in Djibouti.”

As a response to the steady erosion of French influence in francophone Africa, Paris’ motivations behind this pivot and new African strategy seem clear. In terms of what African countries can hope to achieve from this engagement, securing French investment will be a critical priority.

Yates says “even those states who speak poorly of France will not refuse its investments. France’s military is perhaps less welcome, but Macron is not interested in overt displays of military power, so that is no problem.”

Boom in summitry

The Nairobi Summit comes at a time when many world powers are attempting either to redefine their historical approaches to Africa – such as the United Kingdom – or are hosting similar conferences in order to strengthen their diplomatic and commercial interests. Turkey, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Japan are just some of the powers to have arranged Africa summits in recent years.

This means that African countries increasingly have options as to which nations they decide to partner with – a trend which, at least in theory, should optimise their chances of extracting maximum value from those relationships. As Yates puts it, “many rulers are placing their bets on both red and black in the roulette wheel of multilateralism. Spreading their bets is seen as the best strategy.”

“Chinese summits, British summits, French summits…why not? The more the merrier.”